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THE NUCLEOLUS OF LARGE MAJORITY GAMES
SASCHA KURZ, STEFAN NAPEL, AND ANDREAS NOHN
Abstract. Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or
smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game
differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition
for the weight and power distributions to be equal; and we characterize the limit
behavior of the nucleolus in case all relative weights become small.
JEL classification: C61, C71
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1. Introduction
Among all individually rational and efficient payoff vectors in a game v with transferable util-
ity, the nucleolus selects a particularly stable one. It quantifies each coalition’s dissatisfaction
with a proposed vector x as the gap between the coalition’s worth v(S) and the surplus share∑
i∈S xi that is allocated to members of S ⊆ N ; then it selects the allocation x
∗ which involves
lexicographically minimal dissatisfaction. In contrast to other prominent point solutions in
cooperative game theory, such as the Shapley value, x∗ is guaranteed to lie in the core of
game (N, v) whenever that is non-empty.
Even before the final version of Schmeidler’s article which established the definition, exis-
tence, uniqueness, and continuity of the nucleolus was published in 1969, Peleg, see [10], had
applied it to weighted majority games (WMG). In these games the worth of a coalition S of
players is either 1 or 0, i.e., S is either winning or losing, and there exists a non-negative
quota-and-weights representation [q;w1, . . . , wn] such that v(S) = 1 iff
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. The
weight vectors that constitute a representation of a given WMG v for some quota q form a
non-singleton convex set R(v).
Peleg highlighted a property of constant-sum WMGs with a homogeneous representation,
i.e., one where total weight of any minimal winning coalition equals q: the nucleolus x∗ of such
a WMG v is contained in R(v), i.e., it is also a representation.1 Despite this early start, the
relation between voting weights and the nucleolus of weighted majority games – constant-sum
or not, homogeneous or inhomogeneous – has to the best of our knowledge not been studied
systematically so far. This paper is a first attempt to fill this gap.
Discrepancies between weights and the nucleolus matter because the nucleolus is an im-
portant indicator of influence in collective decision bodies. It emerges as an equilibrium
price vector in models that evaluate voters’ attractiveness to competing lobbying groups, see
[17, 15]; more recent theoretical work by Montero ([6, 7]) has established it as a focal equi-
librium prediction for strategic bargaining games with a majority rule.2 So large differences
between a voter i’s weight wi and nucleolus x
∗
i can mean that the real power distribution in a
We thank the Maria Montero, Roberto Serrano and an anonymous referee for helpful discussion and construc-
tive comments on an earlier version.
1 A WMG (N, v) is called constant-sum if for any S ⊆ N either v(S) = 1 or v(N r S) = 1. S ⊆ N is a
minimal winning coalition (MWC) if v(S) = 1 and v(T ) = 0 for any T ⊂ S.
2Corresponding experimental lab evidence is mixed; see [8]. Non-cooperative foundations of the nucleolus for
other than majority games have been given, e.g., by [11] and [13, 14].
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decision body such as a shareholder meeting is hidden from the casual observer. This intrans-
parency can be particularly problematic for political decision bodies, where voting weight
arrangements affect the institution’s legitimacy.3
This paper investigates absolute and relative differences between players’ relative voting
weights as defined by vote shares in an assembly, electoral college, etc. and the nucleolus of
the implied WMG. We determine an upper bound on their ‖ · ‖1-distance which depends only
on quota and maximum weight in a given representation in Lemma 1. The lemma allows to
conclude that if the relative weight of every individual voter in player set {1, . . . , n} tends
to zero, then the ratio x∗i /x
∗
j of two nucleolus components converges to wi/wj for all regular
voters i and j as n→∞ (Prop. 1). This complements analogous limit results in the literature
on the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and voter pivotality on intervals, see [3, 5, 9], as
well as for stationary equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining games à la Baron-Ferejohn,
see [16]. We also establish a new sufficient condition for the nucleolus to coincide with given
relative weights (Prop. 2). It implies that a finite number of replications brings about full
coincidence for any given WMG.
2. Nucleolus
Consider a WMG (N, v) with representation [q;w1, . . . , wn]. Using notation x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi,
a vector x ∈ Rn with xi ≥ v({i}) and x(N) = v(N) is called an imputation. For any
coalition S ⊆ N and imputation x, call e(S, x) = v(S) − x(S) the excess of S at x. It can
be interpreted as quantifying the coalition’s dissatisfaction and potential opposition to an
agreement on allocation x. For any fixed x let S1, . . . , S2n be an ordering of all coalitions such
that the excesses at x are weakly decreasing, and denote these ordered excesses by E(x) =(
e(Sk, x)
)
k=1,...,2n
. Imputation x is lexicographically less than imputation y if Ek(x) < Ek(y)
for the smallest component k with Ek(x) 6= Ek(y). The nucleolus of (N, v) is then uniquely
defined as the lexicographically minimal imputation.4
As an example, consider (N, v) with representation [q;w] = [8; 6, 4, 3, 2]. The nucleolus can
be computed as x∗ = (2/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5) by solving a sequence of linear programs – or by
appealing to the sufficient condition of [10] after noting that the game is constant-sum and
permits a homogeneous representation [q′;w′] = [3; 2, 1, 1, 1]. Denoting the normalization of
weight vector w by w¯, i.e., w¯ = w/
∑
wi, the respective total differences between relative
weights and the nucleolus are ‖w¯−x∗‖1 = 2/15 for the first and ‖w¯
′−x∗‖1 = 0 for the second
representation (with ‖x‖1 =
∑
|xi|).
3. Results
Saying that representation [q;w] is normalized if w = w¯, we have:5
3See [4] for nucleolus-based power analysis of the European Union’s Council; an early-day weight arrangement
meant that Luxembourg had a relative voting weight of 1/17 but zero voting power. – In general, the power-
to-weight ratio can differ arbitrarily from 1. For instance, the nucleolus of the WMG with representation
[0.5; (1− ε)/2, (1− ε)/2, ε] is x∗ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) for any ε ∈ (0; 0.5).
4Schmeidler’s ([12]) original definition did not restrict the considered vectors to be imputations but is usually
specialized this way. The set of imputations that minimize just the largest excess, E1(x), is called the nucleus
of (N, v) by Montero [7]. Our results are stated for the nucleolus but apply to every element of the nucleus:
both coincide under the conditions of Prop. 2; Lemma 1 and Prop. 1 generalize straightforwardly.
5All proofs are provided in the Mathematical Appendix.
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Lemma 1. Consider a normalized representation [q;w] with 0 < q < 1 and w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wn ≥ 0
and let x∗ be the nucleolus of this WMG. Then
‖x∗ − w‖1 ≤
2w1
min{q, 1− q}
. (1)
If we consider a sequence {({1, . . . , n}, v(n))}n∈N of n-player WMGs with representations
[q(n);w(n)] such that the normalized quota q¯(n) is bounded away from 0 and 1 (or, more
generally, 0 and 1 are no cluster points of {q¯(n)}n∈N), and each player i’s normalized weight
w¯
(n)
i vanishes as n→∞ then Lemma 1 implies
lim
n→∞
‖x∗(n) − w¯(n)‖1 → 0. (2)
Convergence to zero of the total difference between nucleolus components x
∗(n)
i and relative
voting weights w¯
(n)
i does not yet guarantee that the nucleolus is asymptotically proportional
to the weight vector, i.e., that each ratio x
∗(n)
i /x
∗(n)
j converges to wi/wj . This can be seen,
e.g., by considering [
q(n);w(n)
]
=
[
2n− 1
2
; 1, 2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
]
. (3)
The nucleolus either equals
(
0, 1
n−1 , . . . ,
1
n−1
)
or
(
1
n
, . . . , 1
n
)
depending on whether n is even
or odd; ratio x
∗(n)
1 /x
∗(n)
2 6=
1
2 alternates between 0 and 1.
But such pathologies are ruled out for players i and j whose weights are “non-singular” in
the weight sequence
{
w(n)
}
n∈N
. Specifically, denote the total number of players i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
with an identical weight of w
(n)
i = ω by mω(n). We say that a player j with weight wj is
regular if mwj(n) · w¯
(n)
j is bounded away from 0 by some constant ε > 0. Lemma 1 then
implies:6
Proposition 1. Consider a sequence
{[
q(n); (w1, . . . , wn)
]}
n∈N
with corresponding normal-
ized quotas that exclude 0 and 1 as cluster points and with normalized weights satisfying
w¯
(n)
k ↓ 0 for every k ∈ N as n → ∞. Then the nucleolus x
∗(n) of the WMG represented by[
q(n); (w1, . . . , wn)
]
satisfies
lim
n→∞
x
∗(n)
i
x
∗(n)
j
=
wi
wj
(4)
for any regular players i and j.
For a considerable class of games, asymptotic equality of nucleolus and normalized weights
can be strengthened to actual equality.7 Namely, for a fixed n-player WMG with representa-
tion [q;w1, . . . , wn] let mω denote the number of players that have weight ω; so
m◦ = min
i∈{1,...,n}
mwi ≥ 1 (5)
is the number of occurrences of the rarest weight in vector w = (w1, . . . , wn).
Proposition 2. Consider a WMG representation [q;w] with integer weights w1 ≥ . . . ≥
wn ≥ 0 and normalization [q¯; w¯]. Denoting the number of numerically distinct values in w by
6We assume w
(n)
j = wj in our exposition. Adaptations to cases where q
(n) and w
(n)
j vary in n are straightfor-
ward. The essential regularity requirement is that a voter type’s aggregate relative weight does not vanish.
7Non-null players have a positive nucleolus value in this case – in contrast to WMGs in general. So we
implicitly establish a sufficient condition for wi > 0⇒ x
∗
i > 0.
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1 ≤ t ≤ n, the nucleolus x∗ of this WMG satisfies
x∗ = w¯ if min{q¯, 1− q¯} ·m◦ > 2tw1
2. (6)
The proposition refers to integer weights. Even though it is not difficult to obtain an integer
representation from any given [q;w] with non-integer values, this is an important restriction.
In particular, it is not possible to rescale a given weight vector w so as to make the maximal
weight w1 arbitrarily small.
8
The right-hand side of the inequality in condition (6) is smaller, the smaller the number
of different weights in the representation, and the smaller the involved integers (particularly
w1). Similarly, the left-hand side is larger, the greater the number of occurrences of the rarest
weight. It follows that condition (6) is most easily met when null players (where x∗i = 0
is known) are removed from the WMG in question and a minimal integer representation is
considered.9 This is automatically also a homogeneous representation if any exists.
Our sufficient condition for x∗ = w¯ is, however, independent of the known homogeneity-
based one. The normalization of weights in [3; 2, 1, 1, 1] must, according to Peleg [10], coincide
with the WMG’s nucleolus because the game is constant-sum; but our condition (6) is violated.
In contrast, the representation [q;w] = [1500; 4, . . . , 4, 3, . . . , 3, 2, . . . , 2] of a 900-player WMG
where each of the t = 3 weight types occurs m◦ = 300 times satisfies our condition. Hence
x∗ = w¯. Since the game is inhomogeneous,10 Peleg’s finding does not apply.
The left-hand side in condition (6) equals at most half the number of occurrences of the
rarest weight, m◦, and the right-hand side is bounded below by 2. This, first, implies that the
condition cannot be met by WMGs where only one instance of some weight type is involved.
This limits Prop. 2’s applicability for small-scale games such as [3; 2, 1, 1, 1]. But, second, it
means that if we consider ρ-replicas of any given n-player WMG with integer representation
[q;w], i.e., a WMG with quota ρq and ρ instances of any of the n voters in [q;w], then one
can compute an explicit number ρ˜ from (6) such that the nucleolus of the resulting ρn-player
WMG must coincide with the corresponding normalized weight vector for every ρ ≥ ρ˜.11 This
observation echoes the coincidence result obtained in [16] for WMG replicas under Baron-
Ferejohn bargaining:12 at least in sufficiently large majority games, voting weight and power
are the same.
8Note also that inequality (6) must be violated if two interchangeable players of (N, v) have different weights
because x∗ = w¯ would then contradict the symmetry property of the nucleolus. So as a subtle implication of the
integer requirement, weight changes which would destroy a given symmetric or ‘type-preserving’ representation
and satisfy (6) are impossible. Another way to look at this is to begin with a WMG’s representation where
wi 6= wj for interchangeable players i and j and then to replicate all players and weights: after enough
replications the two players (types) i and j must lose their interchangeability.
9Uniqueness and other properties of minimal integer representations of WMG are investigated in [2].
10Coalitions with (a) 300, 100, and 0, (b) 300, 0, and 150, or (c) 300, 1 and 149 players of weights 4, 3, and 2
are minimal winning, and cannot be made to have identical aggregate weights in any representation [q′;w′].
11For simple majority games which involve equal numbers of voters with weight ω = 4, 3, and 2, condition (6)
calls for m◦ > 192. But x∗ = w¯ already holds after one replication of [5; 4, 3, 2], i.e., ρ ≥ 2. So tighter
bounds might be obtained by different techniques than ours. However, surprising sensitivity of x∗ to the
game at hand cautions against too high expectations. For instance, x∗ = w¯ if w1 = . . . = w5 = 4 and either
w6 = . . . = w11 = 1 or w6 = . . . = w13 = 1 with q¯ = 58%; in contrast, x
∗ = (1/5, . . . , 1/5, 0, . . . , 0) if
w6 = . . . = w12 = 1. We thank Maria Montero for suggesting this example.
12We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out to us that Snyder et al.’s Prop. 2 is in fact a corollary to
our Prop. 2, the uniqueness of SSPE payoffs recently established in [1], and Montero’s (2006) Prop. 7.
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Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let P be the set of players i such that {i} is a winning coalition of
[q;w]. If |P | > 1, then the nucleolus is not defined. If |P | = 1, then w1 ≥ q, so that the
upper bound is trivially satisfied due to ‖x−w‖1 ≤ 2 for any x ∈ R
n
≥0 with ‖x‖1 = 1. In the
remaining cases we have x∗(S) ≥ q for any winning coalition, since chosing x = w yields a
maximum excess maxS⊆N E(S, x) of at most 1− q.
Define w(S) =
∑
i∈S wi and x
∗(S) =
∑
i∈S x
∗
i . Let S
+ = {i ∈ N | x∗i > wi} and
S− = {i ∈ N | x∗i ≤ wi}. We have w(S
+) < 1 since w(S+) < x(S+) ≤ x(N) = 1, so that
w(S−) > 0. Define 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 by x∗(S−) = (1− δ)w(S−). We have
x∗(S+) = 1− x∗(S−) = w(S+) + w(S−)− (1− δ)w(S−) = w(S+) + δw(S−) (7)
and
‖w−x∗‖1=
∑
i∈S+
(x∗i−wi)+
∑
i∈S−
(wi−x
∗
i )= x
∗(S+)−w(S+)+w(S−)−x∗(S−) = 2δw(S−). (8)
Let T be generated by starting with S = ∅ and successively adding a remaining player i with
minimal x∗i /wi until w(T ) ≥ q.
In case w(S−) ≥ q we then have x∗(T )/w(T ) ≤ x∗(S−)/w(S−) = 1 − δ. Multiplying by
w(T ), using q ≤ w(T ) ≤ q + w1 and finally δ ≤ 1 yields
x∗(T ) ≤ (1− δ)w(T ) ≤ (1− δ)(q + w1) ≤ q(1− δ) +w1. (9)
This and x∗(T ) ≥ q yield δ ≤ w1/q. Applying this and w(S
−) ≤ 1 in equation (8) gives
‖x∗ − w‖1 ≤
2w1
q
.
In case w(S−) < q we have w(S+) > 0. Note that moving from S− to T involves the
weight addition w(T ) − w(S−) which comes with a nucleolus per weight unit of at most
x∗(S+)/w(S+). So
x∗(T ) = x∗(S−) + x∗(T\S−)
≤ (1− δ)w(S−) +
x∗(S+)
w(S+)
·
(
w(T ) −w(S−)
)
≤ (1− δ)w(S−) +
x∗(S+)
w(S+)
·
(
q − w(S−) + w1
)
(10)
where the last inequality uses w(T ) ≤ q + w1. Rearranging with x
∗(S+) = w(S+) + δw(S−)
and w(S−) = 1−w(S+) yields
x∗(T ) ≤ q +
w(S+) + δw(S−)
w(S+)
· w1 −
(1− q)δw(S−)
w(S+)
. (11)
Since δ ≤ 1 the right hand side of (11) is at most q +
(
w1 − (1 − q)δw(S
−)
)
/w(S+). So
q ≤ x∗(T ) implies (1− q)δw(S−) ≤ w1. Hence ‖x− w‖1 ≤
2w1
1−q . 
Proof of Proposition 1. If x
∗(n)
i / w¯
(n)
i ≥ 1+ δ or x
∗(n)
i / w¯
(n)
i ≤ 1− δ then ‖x
∗(n)− w¯(n)‖1 ≥
δ ·mwi(n) · w¯
(n)
i ≥ δε for some ε > 0 if i is regular. But limn→∞
||x∗(n) − w¯(n)||1 = 0 (Lemma 1).
So lim
n→∞
x
∗(n)
i / w¯
(n)
i = 1 and hence
1 = lim
n→∞
x
∗(n)
i
w¯
(n)
i
·
w¯
(n)
j
x
∗(n)
j
= lim
n→∞
x
∗(n)
i
x
∗(n)
j
·
wj
wi
if i and j are regular. (12)

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Proof of Proposition 2. It suffices to prove the result in case wn > 0 because wi = 0
directly implies x∗i = 0. We may also assume 0 < q¯ < 1. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , t} let ωk
denote the normalized weight of a voter i with type k (i.e., w¯i = ωk) and, with slight abuse
of notation, let x∗k be this voter/type’s nucleolus. Define rk = x
∗
k/ωk and w.l.o.g. assume
r1 ≥ . . . ≥ rt. Let a denote the largest index such that r1 = ra and b be the smallest such
that rb = rt. The claim is true if a ≥ b. So we suppose a < b and establish a contradiction
by showing that we can construct an imputation x∗∗ with maximum excess E1(x
∗∗) smaller
than E1(x
∗).
Writing ε = 12 ·min{q¯, 1− q¯} and nk = mωk , the premise and t, w1 ≥ 1 imply
w1 ≤ tw1
2 < εm◦ ≤ εnk (13)
for each k ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Considering ωk-weighted sums of (13) we obtain
(I)
∑
k≤a
w1ωk < ε
∑
k≤a
nkωk and (II)
∑
k≥b
w1ωk < ε
∑
k≥b
nkωk.
Moreover, we have
(III)
∑
k<b
w1ωk < ε
∑
k≥b
nkωk and (IV) w¯1 +
∑
k>a
w1ωk < ε
∑
k≤a
nkωk.
Inequality (III) follows from∑
k<b
w1ωk < tw1w¯1 =
tw1
2
w(N)
<
εm◦
w(N)
≤ ε
∑
k≥b
nkωk (14)
using 1/w(N) ≤ ωk ≤ w¯1 and (13). Similarly, (IV) follows from
w¯1 +
∑
k>a
w1ωk ≤ w¯1 + (t− 1)w1w¯1 ≤ t
w1
2
w(N)
< εm◦
1
w(N)
≤ ε
∑
k≤a
nkωk. (15)
Let nTk denote the number of k-type voters in a coalition T ⊆ N and define
D(T ) =
∑
k≤a
nTk ωk∑
k≤a
nkωk
and I(T ) =
∑
k≥b
nTk ωk∑
k≥b
nkωk
. (16)
D(T ) is the share of the total weight of the a “most over-represented” types (all having maximal
nucleolus-to-relative weight ratio x∗1/ω1) which they contribute in coalition T . Similarly, I(T )
is the respective share for the t− b+ 1 “most under-represented” types.
Given a suitably large coalition S ⊆ N , replacing wh members of type k – all with absolute
weight wk – by wk players of type h yields a coalition S
′ with w(S′) = w(S). But if rk > rh,
such replacement yields x∗(S′) < x∗(S). Thus, for a MWC T with maximum excess at x∗, i.e.,
with excess 1− x∗(T ) ≥ v(S)− x∗(S) for all S ⊆ N , there are no k, h with rk > rh such that
(i) w1 or more type k-players belong to T and (ii) w1 or more type h-players do not belong to
T . This consideration restricts the numbers of members nTk of players of type k in any MWC
T with maximum excess. There are three cases, for each of which we show I(T )−D(T ) > 0:
Case 1:: nTk < w1 for all types 1 ≤ k < b.
Then the relative weight
∑
k≤a n
T
k ωk in T of the most over-represented types is
less than
∑
k≤aw1ωk. So inequality (I) implies D(T ) < ε. Since T is a winning
coalition, the weight
∑
k≥b n
T
k ωk in T of the most under-represented types is greater
than q¯ −
∑
k<bw1ωk. Due to (III) and
∑
k≥b nkωk ≤ 1 we have I(T ) > q¯ − ε. So
I(T )−D(T ) > q¯ − 2ε ≥ 0.
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Case 2:: nTk ≥ w1 for some 1 ≤ k ≤ a but nh − n
T
h < w1 for all a < h ≤ t.
13
Using that T is a MWC, the relative weight
∑
k≤a n
T
k ωk in T of the most over-
represented types is less than q¯ + w¯1 −
∑
k>a (nk − w1)ωk in this case. So inequal-
ity (IV) and
∑
k≤a nkωk ≤ 1 imply D(T ) < q¯ + ε. Moreover, the weight
∑
k≥b n
T
k ωk
in T of the most under-represented types is greater than
∑
k≥b (nk − w1)ωk and in-
equality (II) implies I(T ) > 1− ε. So I(T )−D(T ) > 1− q¯ − 2ε ≥ 0.
Case 3:: nTl < w1 for all 1 ≤ l ≤ a and n
T
k ≥ w1 for some a < k < b but nh − n
T
h < w1
for all b ≤ h ≤ t.
The relative weight
∑
l≤a n
T
l ωl in T of the most over-represented types is then less
than
∑
l≤a w1ωl. So inequality (I) implies D(T ) < ε. Similarly, the total weight of
the players of types b ≤ h ≤ t is greater than
∑
h≥b (nh − w1)ωh. Inequality (II) then
implies I(T ) > 1− ε and we have I(T )−D(T ) > 1− 2ε > q¯ − 2ε ≥ 0.
Recall that x∗k ≥ wk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a. So for sufficiently small σ > 0
x∗∗k (σ) =


x∗k − σωk if 1 ≤ k ≤ a,
x∗k if a < k < b, and
x∗k + δσωk if b ≤ k ≤ t
(17)
with δ =
∑
k≤a nkωk/
∑
l≥b nlωl > 0 is an imputation. x
∗∗
k (σ)’s continuity implies existence
of σ > 0 so that no S with e(S, x∗) < E1(x
∗) has maximum excess at x∗∗(σ). We fix such a
value of σ and write x∗∗ = x∗∗(σ).
It then suffices to consider coalitions T ′ with maximum excess at x∗ in order to show the
contradiction E1(x
∗∗) < E1(x
∗). Such T ′ has to be winning, and for any MWC T ⊆ T ′ it
must be true that e(x∗, T ) = e(x∗, T ′) = E1(x
∗). Since T and T ′ both are winning we have
e(x∗∗, T ′) ≤ e(x∗∗, T ) and
E1(x
∗∗) = max{e(x∗∗, T ) : T is MWC and e(x∗, T ) = E1(x
∗)}. (18)
Moreover, for every T on the right-hand side of equation (18)
e(x∗∗, T )−E1(x
∗) = e(x∗∗, T )− e(x∗, T ) = −σ ·
(
I(T )−D(T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)
·
∑
k≤a
nkωk < 0 (19)
implies e(x∗∗, T ) < E1(x
∗), so that E1(x
∗∗) < E1(x
∗). 
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